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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE LAWRENCE READER:
STANDHARDT AND LEWIS ON WOMEN IN LOVE

MARK STRASSER*

I. INTRODUCTION
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court struck down a Texas statute
criminalizing same-sex sodomy.1 The Lawrence Court made clear that it was
not deciding whether the United States Constitution required recognizing
same-sex unions,2 although Justice Scalia in dissent suggested that the
Lawrence majority had paved the way for establishing that such unions were
constitutionally protected.3 Since that decision was issued, at least two courts
in two different states have examined whether same-sex marriage bans violate
federal constitutional guarantees.4 While both courts expressly mention
Lawrence, neither analyzes the most important aspects of the Lawrence
decision. Both courts offer analyses of the right to privacy which cannot
account for those liberties that the Court has found protected by that right, even
bracketing the liberty which the Court found protected in Lawrence. Both
courts offer rationales which are so implausible that they would likely never be
offered in any other context. While Lawrence did not hold that same-sex
marriages must be recognized, the refusal of these courts to take the case
seriously suggests that the decision may be very important as cases continue to
be brought and courts begin to acknowledge that Lawrence has important
implications for the right to privacy generally and the right to marry in
particular.

* Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School.
1. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
2. Id. (noting that the case “does not involve whether the government must give formal
recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter”).
3. Id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today’s opinion dismantles the structure of
constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual and
homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned.”).
4. See Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2003); Lewis v. Harris, No. MER-L-15-03, 2003 WL 23191114 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
Nov. 5, 2003). In Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the state’s same-sex marriage ban was unconstitutional
on state constitutional grounds.
59
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Part II of this article discusses Standhardt v. Superior Court, in which an
Arizona appellate court held that the state’s same-sex marriage ban passed
constitutional muster.5 This part shows that the Standhardt court not only
misconstrued the relevant constitutional jurisprudence, but state public policy
as well. Ironically, although it upheld the statute, the Standhardt court offered
powerful ammunition to those seeking to establish that same-sex unions are
protected by the Federal Constitution, since the decision suggests that such
bans undermine rather than promote both the interests of the state and the
interests of those families whose members would benefit if such relationships
were legally recognized.
Part III of this article discusses Lewis v. Harris, in which a New Jersey
trial court rejected a constitutional challenge to New Jersey’s same-sex
marriage ban.6 The court offered an essentialist understanding of marriage as a
union of one man and one woman,7 thereby ignoring developments that had
already taken place before the decision had been written. Further, the court
implied that the right to marry a same-sex partner did not implicate an
important interest, thereby suggesting either that same-sex couples are
different from different-sex couples in very significant, albeit non-disclosed,
ways or that the right to marry does not implicate an important interest for any
couples, current right to privacy jurisprudence notwithstanding. The Lewis
court’s reasoning is no more persuasive than is the Standhardt court’s, and the
decision by each court to pay mere lip service to Lawrence suggests that the
decision may significantly transform the law once courts start to take it
seriously.
This article concludes by pointing to some of the different facets of
Lawrence which must be considered when addressing the constitutionality of
same-sex marriage bans. While Lawrence was notably silent about whether
the Constitution protects such unions, the Lawrence Court began a new chapter
in right to privacy jurisprudence which calls out for examination. It can only
be hoped that other courts will reject the example offered by the Standhardt
and Lewis courts and, instead, heed that call.
II. STANDHARDT ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
PROHIBITIONS
In Standhardt v. Superior Court, an Arizona appellate court examined
whether the state’s same-sex marriage ban violated federal constitutional
guarantees.8 The court correctly understood that the Lawrence Court did not

5.
6.
7.
8.

Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 465.
Lewis, 2003 WL 23191114, at *28.
Id. at *3.
Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 453.
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hold that the Federal Constitution required the recognition of same-sex
marriage, but seemed to ignore much of the rest of the decision.9 The court
seemed to come close to admitting that its own rationales for upholding the ban
defied both logic and common sense,10 but refused to take the final step in its
own analysis and instead upheld the rationality of the statute.11 While the
court’s refusal to strike down the state’s same-sex marriage ban was itself
unsurprising, the court’s willingness to offer rationales which would have been
embarrassing to offer in any other context was quite surprising—many readers
of the opinion will wonder whether the court was unaware of the implications
of its own opinion or, instead, was aware but unwilling for other reasons to
reach the result dictated by the very arguments offered.
A.

On Right to Privacy Jurisprudence

When the Clerk of the Superior Court denied a marriage license to Harold
Standhardt and Tod Keltner three days after the United States Supreme Court
issued Lawrence,12 they challenged the denial as a violation of their state and
federal constitutional rights.13 Standhardt and Keltner petitioned the court of
appeals to compel the Clerk to issue the license and to declare the state’s samesex marriage ban unconstitutional.14 The court accepted jurisdiction, reasoning
that there were no issues of fact that needed to be established below and that
the review of the trial court ruling on a constitutional challenge to a statute
would be de novo in any event.15
The United States Supreme Court recognized in Zablocki v. Redhail that
“the right to marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals”16 and the
Standhardt court began its analysis by recognizing that the right to marry is a
fundamental right.17 The issue before the court was not whether individuals

9. Id. at 456 (“Neither the United States Supreme Court nor any Arizona court has
explicitly recognized that the fundamental right to marry includes the freedom to choose a samesex spouse.”).
10. See, e.g., id. at 462-63 (noting that the State is allegedly reserving marriage for differentsex couples for the sake of children but same-sex couples also have children who need and
deserve the benefits that would accrue were their parents permitted to marry).
11. Id. at 463 (finding that though the “line drawn between couples who marry (oppositesex) and those who may not (same-sex) may result in some inequity for children raised by samesex couples, such inequity is insufficient to negate the State’s link between opposite-sex
marriage, procreation, and child-rearing”).
12. Id. at 453.
13. Standhart, 77 P.3d at 453.
14. Id at 454.
15. Id.
16. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978).
17. Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 455 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)).
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with a same-sex orientation have the right to marry, but whether the right to
marry includes the right to marry someone of the same sex.18
Perhaps it could be argued that same-sex relationships do not have value
and thus should not be recognized by the state. Yet, the Lawrence Court made
clear why such a claim and analysis are mistaken. For example, as the
Standhardt court noted, the Lawrence Court “spoke of a person’s liberty
interest to engage in same-gender sexual relations . . . as ‘one element in a
personal bond that is more enduring,’”19 implying that the sexual relations
were protected, at least in part, because of the role that they can play in such
relationships. The Lawrence Court made clear that “adults may choose to enter
upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives
and still retain their dignity as free persons.”20 Such reasoning at least suggests
that the personal bond is itself constitutionally protected.
Recognizing that the Lawrence Court “acknowledg[ed] a homosexual
person’s right to define his or her own existence, and achieve the type of
individual fulfillment that is a hallmark of a free society, by entering a
homosexual relationship,” the Standhardt court declined to recognize that
“such a right includes the choice to enter a state-sanctioned, same-sex
marriage.”21 Certainly, the court was correct that Lawrence did not establish
the right to marry a same-sex partner,22 but that does not end the inquiry. The
relevant issue is whether the reasoning of Lawrence implies that the right to
marry a same-sex partner is also constitutionally protected.
Justice Scalia suggested in his Lawrence dissent that the Court’s “opinion
dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to
be made between heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal
recognition in marriage is concerned.”23 Such an observation would seem to
merit discussion and analysis. Instead, the Standhardt court summarily
dismissed Justice Scalia’s observation by noting that “with due respect to
Justice Scalia, we do not read the Court’s comments so broadly,”24 and by
suggesting that Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey25
does not stand for the proposition that couples have “the choice to enter a state-

18. Id. at 454.
19. Id. at 457 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003)).
20. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
21. Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 457.
22. Id. See also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (noting that case does not involve whether the
“government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to
enter”).
23. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
24. Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 457 n.7.
25. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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sanctioned, same-sex marriage.”26 Yet, Justice Scalia was not implying that
Casey or Lawrence stated that same-sex couples had the right to marry but,
instead, that after Lawrence the Court would be unable to offer a plausible
explanation for why such unions were not protected by the Federal
Constitution.27
The Standhardt court offered an analysis of Lawrence which yielded the
surprising conclusion that the decision undermined the claim that same-sex
unions were protected by the Federal Constitution.28 To reach that result, the
court had to misconstrue not only Lawrence but the entire right to privacy
jurisprudence.
The Standhardt court pointed out that although the Lawrence Court struck
down the Texas same-sex sodomy statute, the Court “did not declare that
participation in such conduct is a fundamental right.”29 In an amazing
interpretation of the existing jurisprudence, the Standhardt court then
concluded, “If the Court did not view such an intimate expression of the bond
securing a homosexual relationship to be a fundamental right, we must reject
any notion that the Court intended to confer such status on the right to secure
state-sanctioned recognition of such a union.”30 The Standhardt court thereby
made several mistakes. First, after Lawrence, the statutes abridging the right to
engage in adult, consensual relations31 will now be given close scrutiny
because the Court has found this interest to be protected by the right to
privacy—the right to engage in adult, consensual, non-marital relations may
now be constitutionally protected to the same extent as, for example, the right
to have access to contraception.32 Second, the Standhardt court assumes that
an interest will be deemed fundamental only if it is so described in the very
decision in which the Court finds it constitutionally protected. Yet, if that were
so, many of the interests which are now considered fundamental would not be
so considered.33 Third, even if the right to engage in non-marital relations with
a same-sex partner were not a fundamental right, this would hardly mean that

26. Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 457.
27. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
28. Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 457.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. The Court may well not include the right to commit adultery within this right, since that
might be thought an “abuse of an institution the law protects.” See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
32. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (establishing that right of married
persons to have access to contraception is protected by the right to privacy). See also Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (establishing rights of single persons to have access to
contraception).
33. See infra notes 34-80 and accompanying text.
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the right to marry a same-sex partner would therefore also not be a
fundamental right.
B.

How Fundamental Is the Right to Engage in Non-Marital Relations?

The Standhardt court made much of Justice Scalia’s point in his Lawrence
dissent34 that the Lawrence Court did not once “describe homosexual sodomy
as a ‘fundamental right’ or a ‘fundamental liberty interest.’”35 Justice Scalia
then claimed that according to the Lawrence majority “the application of
Texas’s statute to petitioners’ conduct fails the rational-basis test”36 because
the “Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”37 He thus
implied that the State’s interest at issue in Lawrence was not a particularly
important one.
Yet, the Court’s failure to describe same-sex sodomy as a fundamental
right does not have the import that Justice Scalia or the Standhardt court
implies. Many of the interests that are now recognized as fundamental were
not so described in the opinions in which their constitutionally protected status
was recognized. Rather, the Court simply noted, as it did in Lawrence, that the
state’s interests were not sufficiently robust to justify the state’s intrusion into
these protected areas.38
In Roe v. Wade the Court explained that “only personal rights that can be
deemed ‘fundamental’ . . . are included in this guarantee of personal
privacy.”39 The Roe Court explained that the rights protected by the right to
privacy include marriage,40 procreation,41 contraception,42 family
relationships,43 and child rearing and education.44 Yet, many of these rights
implicating fundamental interests were not described as fundamental in the
decisions in which they were found to be constitutionally protected.
Consider, for example, the right to make decisions about one’s child’s
education. In Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and
Mary, the Court examined and struck down an Oregon law precluding parents

34. Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 457.
35. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 594 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 578.
39. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
40. Id. (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)).
41. Id. (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942)).
42. Id. (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972)).
43. Id. at 153 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
44. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) and
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 393 (1923)).
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from sending their children to private school.45 The Court found that such a
law “unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.”46
However, the Pierce Court did not describe the right or interest at issue as
fundamental. The Court noted that “rights guaranteed by the Constitution may
not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some
purpose within the competency of the state.”47
By the same token, when the Court in Meyer v. Nebraska struck down a
law which prohibited teaching modern foreign languages to children who had
not yet passed the eighth grade,48 the Court noted that the liberty to direct the
education of one’s children “may not be interfered with, under the guise of
protecting the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without
reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the state to
effect.”49 While the Meyer Court suggested that “the individual has certain
fundamental rights which must be respected,”50 the Court did not state that
parents have a fundamental right not to have their children precluded from
learning modern foreign languages.
In Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court recognized that “the custody, care
and nurture of the child reside first in the parents” and that there is a “private
realm of family life which the state cannot enter.”51 However, the Prince Court
did not describe the interest implicated in that decision as fundamental and,
indeed, upheld the State’s power to prevent a child from handing out the
Jehovah’s Witness publications in exchange for donations.52
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court spoke eloquently about marriage,
describing it as “a coming together for better or for worse,” and something
which is “intimate to the degree of being sacred.”53 The Court further
described it as “an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our
prior decisions.”54 However, the Griswold Court was not asked to decide
whether marriage was a fundamental interest, but rather whether access to
contraception for married couples involved a fundamental interest. While
striking down the Connecticut law that limited access to contraception for

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530 n.1, 534.
Id. at 534-35.
Id. at 535.
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401-02.
Id. at 399-400.
Id. at 401.
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
Id. at 168-69.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
Id.
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married couples, the Court nowhere described the right to access contraception
as a fundamental right.55
In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court addressed whether unmarried persons
have a right to have access to contraception.56 The court below had suggested
that a fundamental human right was at issue,57 but the Eisenstadt Court
expressly declined to address that issue.58 Instead, the Court merely suggested
that “whatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be,
the rights must be the same for the married and unmarried alike.”59 Once again,
the Court nowhere mentioned that the right to access contraception was a
fundamental interest, liberty or right.
The Roe Court noted that “a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of
certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution,”60 that this
“right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy,”61 and that “only personal rights
that can be deemed “fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty’62 are included in this guarantee of privacy.”63 Here, the Court suggests
but never explicitly states that the right to an abortion is a fundamental right.
The Lawrence Court suggested that the conduct at issue before the Court
was protected by the Due Process Clause’s protection of liberty.64 To reach
that result, the Court cited Pierce, Meyer, Griswold, Eisentadt and Roe, the
very cases which establish the contours of the right to privacy.65 By doing so,
the Court suggests that the right to engage in adult, consensual relations has the
same kind of constitutional protection as do those other interests, although the
Court never states that the right to engage in adult, consensual relations is
fundamental.
While Justice Scalia and the Standhardt court are correct that the Lawrence
Court never described the right to engage in adult, consensual relations as
fundamental, that hardly establishes that such relations are not due
constitutional protection. Most of the fundamental rights protected by the right
of privacy were not called fundamental in the decisions in which the Court
established that they were constitutionally protected, and thus the Court’s

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 441-42 (1972).
Id. at 453.
Id. (“We need not and do not . . . decide that important question in this case . . . .”).
Id.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1972).
Id. at 153.
Id. at 152 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
Id.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
Id. at 565-66.
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failure to describe adult, consensual non-marital relations as fundamental
hardly has the significance suggested by the Standhardt court.
C. What Test Determines Whether an Interest Is Fundamental?
One of the reasons that the Standhardt court upheld the state’s same-sex
marriage ban was that “same-sex marriages are neither deeply rooted in the
legal and social history of our Nation . . . nor are they implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.”66 Yet, one of the questions at hand is whether that is the
correct test for determining which rights are fundamental.
A brief
consideration of the right to privacy jurisprudence or of those rights which are
included within the right to privacy suggests that this is simply the wrong test
for determining whether a right is fundamental.
Consider the Roe Court’s suggestion that only rights that are fundamental
or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty fall within the right to privacy.67
By using the word “or” rather than “and,” the Court was implicitly rejecting
that the criterion for determining whether something was fundamental was
whether it was implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Rather, the Court was
suggesting that an interest in having an abortion, for example, could be
fundamental even if it was not implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
It should hardly be surprising that the Roe Court was unwilling to say that
the test for determining fundamental rights was whether the interest at issue
was implicit in the concept of ordered liberty or even that it was deeply rooted
in the Nation’s history and traditions, even if one believes that abortion could
not be so described.68 The prohibition at issue in Griswold had been on the
books for over eighty years69 and the prohibition at issue in Eisenstadt had
been on the books for over ninety years.70 Neither could plausibly have been
described as fundamental or protected by the right to privacy were the relevant
tests whether the interest at issue was implicit in the concept of ordered liberty
or even deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and traditions.
The Standhardt court suggested that those rights and interests which are
accorded heightened protection are those “freedoms protected in the Bill of
Rights” and those “rights and interests . . . ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s

66. Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, 77 P. 3d 451, 459 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2003).
67. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
68. Id. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (suggesting that abortion was not so deeply rooted
in the Nation’s history and traditions as to be fundamental).
69. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 501 (1961) (“The Connecticut law prohibiting the use of
contraceptives has been on the state books since 1879.”).
70. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972) (“Section 21 stems from Mass. Stat. 1879,
c. 159, §1, which prohibited without exception, distribution of articles intended to be used as
contraceptives.”).
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history and tradition,’ . . . and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such
that ‘neither liberty not justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’”71 Yet,
such a test cannot account for those interests which the Supreme Court has
previously found fundamental. Not only can it not account for the rights to
contraception and abortion, but it cannot account for the right to marry
someone of a different race.72
Certainly, the history and traditions of the Nation do not protect the right to
engage in non-marital relations, regardless of whether the couple having those
relations is composed of individuals of the same sex or of different sexes.
However, the Lawrence Court nonetheless held that the Constitution protected
the right to engage in such relations.73 While the Lawrence Court did not
“describe homosexual sodomy as a ‘fundamental right’ or a ‘fundamental
liberty interest,’”74 the Court nonetheless cited several due process cases to
ground its holding,75 thereby suggesting but not stating that the interest at issue
was of fundamental importance.
The Lawrence Court suggested that the “Texas statute furthers no
legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and
private life of the individual.”76 However, this suggestion does not entail that
the statute furthers no legitimate interest at all. It could simply indicate that
even if the state has a legitimate interest at stake, that interest is not sufficiently
important to justify the intrusion into the individuals’ private lives. The
Lawrence Court’s comment about the Texas law is very similar to the Pierce
Court’s suggestion that the Oregon law “unreasonably interfere[d] with the
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control.”77 It is also similar to the Meyer Court’s
suggestion that that the liberty to direct the education of one’s children “may
not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting the public interest, by
legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some
purpose within the competency of the state to effect.”78 Basically, in each of
71. Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 455 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21
(1997)).
72. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (striking down Virginia antimiscegenation law). Virginia’s anti-miscegenation laws traced back to the colonial period. Id. at
6.
73. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
74. Id. at 594 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 564-65 (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923), Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Carey v. Population Services, Int’l, 431
U.S. 678 (1977)).
76. Id. at 578.
77. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
78. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2005]

THE LAWRENCE READER

69

these cases, the Court suggested that the state’s interests were not sufficiently
strong to justify the intrusion that the state was making.
The current right to privacy jurisprudence cannot be understood as
somehow having employed the “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition” or the “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” tests for
determining fundamental rights. Were that not reason enough to eschew the
test used by the Standhardt court, the Lawrence Court gave an additional
reason to reject that test. Instead of looking to those practices which have
historically been protected, the Lawrence Court noted that “times can blind us
to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary
and proper in fact serve only to oppress.”79 Indeed, the Court almost issued an
invitation for “persons in every generation . . . [to] invoke its [the Due Process
Clause’s] principles in their own search for greater freedom.”80 Thus, the
Standhardt court erred in a number of respects. First, the Lawrence Court was
simply acting as the Court had in the past when, without expressly specifying
that the interest at issue was fundamental, it nonetheless recognized that the
interest at issue was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of
liberty and thus not permissibly prohibited by the state. Second, the test
suggested by the Standhardt court for determining which rights are
fundamental is simply the wrong test, since it cannot account for the interests
that the Court has recognized as fundamental.
D. Prioritizing Relationships over Sexual Relations
Suppose that the Standhardt court had been correct that the Lawrence
Court was not recognizing that adult, consensual, non-marital relations
implicate a fundamental interest protected by the right to privacy but instead
was merely suggesting that the Texas statute could not survive rational basis
scrutiny. A separate issue is whether the Standhardt court was correct in
stating that if the same-sex relations did not implicate a fundamental interest,
then same-sex relationships could not either.
Consider McLaughlin v. Florida81 and Loving v. Virginia.82
In
McLaughlin, the Court struck down a Florida law which more severely
punished interracial, non-marital relations than intra-racial, non-marital
relations,83 while expressly refusing to address the state’s interracial marriage
ban.84 The Court reasoned that the State’s public policy might be “adequately
79. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579.
80. Id.
81. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
82. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
83. McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 196.
84. Id. (“We accordingly invalidate § 798.05 without expressing any views about the State’s
prohibition of interracial marriage . . . . ”).
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served by the general, neutral, and existing ban on illicit behavior as by a
provision . . . which singles out the promiscuous interracial couple for special
statutory treatment.”85 Thus, the McLaughlin Court did not suggest that the
Constitution precluded the State from prohibiting non-marital sexual
relations—indeed, the Court was sympathetic to the State’s wish to “prevent
breaches of the basic concepts of sexual decency” given that it dealt with
“illicit extramarital and premarital promiscuity.”86 Nonetheless, the Court
suggested that the Constitution precluded the State from treating interracial and
intra-racial non-marital coupling differently.87 A mere three years later in
Loving, the Court cited McLaughlin with approval and struck down Virginia’s
anti-miscegenation law.88 Thus, the Loving Court recognized the fundamental
nature of the right to marry a different-race partner89 without also recognizing
a fundamental right to engage in non-marital sexual relations with someone of
the same or a different race, although the Court cited McLaughlin with
approval for the proposition that interracial couples could not be punished
more severely than intra-racial couples for engaging in non-marital relations.90
There was no contradiction in the Loving Court’s striking down an antimiscegenation law while permitting even-handed punishment of fornication
and adultery. The Court has long privileged marriage and family over sexual
relations per se. In Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, the Court had
noted that “[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race.”91 Even earlier, in Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court had
explained in an oft-quoted passage that liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause protects “the right of the individual . . . to marry, establish a home and
bring up children.”92 Given the Court’s long-standing privileging of
relationships, especially marriage, over non-marital sexual relations, at least
two points might be made: (1) Even if same-sex relations were not recognized
as protected by the right to privacy, that would not entail that same-sex
marriage would similarly not be protected. As McLaughlin and Loving
illustrate, the Court might well uphold even-handed punishment of non-marital
relations while nonetheless recognizing that the right to marry is protected by
the right to privacy.93 (2) The Lawrence Court held that the conduct at issue in
Lawrence was protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 196.
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
Id. at 12.
See id. at 10-11.
Skinner v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
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Amendment.94 Were the Court to hold that the right to engage in same-sex
non-marital relations is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment but that the
right to marry a same-sex partner is not, it would invert the traditional
prioritization given to marriage and family. It is perhaps for this reason,
among others, that Justice Scalia rhetorically asked in his Lawrence dissent,
“[W]hat justification could there possibly be for denying the benefits of
marriage to homosexual couples exercising ‘[t]he liberty protected by the
Constitution?’”95
E.

On Loving

The Standhardt court understood that Loving might seem problematic for
its analysis, since the Loving Court struck down a Virginia statute which had
existed in varying forms since colonial times.96 Indeed, the Standhardt court
expressly recognized that “historical custom supported such antimiscegenation laws,”97 understanding that interracial marriage was not implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty nor deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and
traditions, but was still protected as a fundamental right. Nonetheless, the
court implied that Loving supported its position because that decision merely
“expanded the traditional scope of the fundamental right to marry.”98
The Standhardt court distinguished same-sex marriage from interracial
marriage, arguing that implicit in Loving “is the notion that marriage, often
linked to procreation, is a union forged between one man and one woman.”99
Yet, this is at best a misleading characterization of the opinion. While it is
accurate to suggest that the Loving Court was not addressing same-sex
marriage, it is inaccurate to suggest that the restriction is implicit in the
decision, as if the decision’s reasoning and holding would somehow have been
undermined had the Court not been restricting its focus to different-sex
marriage.
Suppose, for example, that Virginia were to recognize same-sex marriages
but were additionally to say that such marriages could only be celebrated by
individuals of the same race. Were such a statute to come before the Supreme
Court, the Court would strike it down, quoting the following from the Loving
opinion in support: “There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to
94. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
95. Id. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
96. See Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 541 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2003); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (striking down Virginia’s antimiscegenation law). Id. at 6 (noting that Virginia’s anti-miscegenation laws traced back to
colonial period).
97. Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 458.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of
the Equal Protection Clause.”100
Insofar as the Standhardt court reads Loving as “anchored to the concept of
marriage as a union involving persons of the opposite sex,”101 it presumably is
not talking about the part of the opinion which addresses the impermissibility
of restricting marriage on the basis of the races of the would-be marital parties.
Rather, the court must be referring only to the part of Loving in which the
Court recognizes that interracial marriage bans deprive interracial couples “of
liberty without due process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”102 Yet, here too language employed by the Loving
Court would support the impermissibility of same-sex marriage bans. For
example, the Loving Court noted that the “freedom to marry has long been
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.”103 Yet, the right to marry a same-sex partner might
also be essential to the pursuit of happiness; thus, this aspect of Loving
supports rather than undermines that same-sex marriage, like interracial
marriage, is protected by the Federal Constitution.
The Standhardt court seemed to believe that implicit in Loving was the
view that marriage is tied to procreation in an important way.104 As support for
that interpretation, the Standhardt court noted that the Loving Court, quoting
Skinner, described marriage as “one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’
fundamental to our very existence and survival.”105 Ironically, the Standhardt
court misunderstood the import of the Loving Court’s having selectively
quoted from Skinner106 and would have been offering an at best implausible
interpretation even if the court had been correct that Loving was emphasizing
the importance of procreation.
When the Loving Court described marriage as essential to our existence
and survival, it quoted Skinner in support.107 However, Loving only repeated
part of the Skinner quotation. The Skinner Court had stated, “Marriage and
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race,”108
and it seems plausible to think that the Loving Court was trying to deemphasize rather than emphasize the role of procreation.

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 458.
Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
Id.
See Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 458.
Id. (citing Loving, 388 U.S. at 12); Id. n.9.
316 U.S. 535 (1942).
Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
Id.; Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (emphasis added).
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Consider the kinds of arguments offered by Virginia in support of its
interracial ban. Many of the reasons involved the state’s alleged interest in
keeping the races pure—the Loving Court noted the claim that “the State’s
legitimate purposes were ‘to preserve the racial integrity of its citizens,’ and to
prevent ‘the corruption of blood,’ a ‘mongrel breed of citizens’ and ‘the
obliteration of racial pride.’”109 The Loving Court shifted the emphasis from
the children that might be produced from the marriage to the implicated
fundamental interest of the adults.
That the Loving Court de-emphasized the importance of children in the
context of marriage was neither surprising nor novel. The Court had decided
Griswold v. Connecticut110 a mere two years earlier. There, the Court had
extolled the virtues and importance of marriage while holding that the United
States Constitution accorded protection to contraception for married couples.111
Were marriage protected solely because of its link to procreation, the result in
Griswold would have been very different.
Suppose, however, that the Court had linked marriage to procreation. That
still would not dictate the result suggested by the Standhardt court. This
becomes clear when one considers why the Court believes marriage and
procreation are fundamental.
Consider the Skinner Court’s point that marriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the human race. 112 While
the Court did not offer further explanation of the link that it envisioned, it
seems plausible that the Court believed that the marital setting provides an
environment in which children can flourish. Yet, children can flourish in
homes in which they are not biologically related to both or even either of their
parents.113 Thus, the human race will continue as long as members of the next
generation have a place in which they will be nurtured and can thrive. While
the child’s biological parents might well be able to provide such a setting,
others can too, and the human race will continue as long as children are born
and these nurturing homes are provided.114

109. Loving, 388 U.S. at 7 (quoting Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955)); see
Loving v. Virginia, 147 S.E.2d 78, 81 (Va. 1966) (Supreme Court of Virginia citing with
approval its own prior decision in Naim). See also id. at 80 (stating that Naim analysis is both
controlling and decisive).
110. 318 U.S. 479 (1965).
111. Id. at 485-86.
112. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
113. Mark Strasser, Adoption and the Best Interests of the Child: On the Use and Abuse of
Studies, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 629, 632, 634 (2003) (discussing studies showing that children
thrive in households with same-sex parents that are not biologically related to the child).
114. See id.
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When discussing the rights to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, the Meyer Court did not suggest that the right to marry was
contingent on one’s raising children and certainly did not suggest that it was
contingent upon raising children biologically related to both members of the
marital couple.115 Rather, the Court was listing essential interests protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.116 Thus, individuals
have a fundamental interest in marriage even if they are not raising children
and individuals have a fundamental interest in having and raising children even
if they are not married. Currently, children are raised in many types of
families—the Court has recently recognized the “demographic changes of the
past century [which] make it difficult to speak of an average American
family.”117
The Standhardt court cited Zablocki v. Redhail118 as one of the cases
establishing the fundamental nature of the right to marry.119 Zablocki is
important for a number of reasons. For example, it made clear that the
“leading decision of this Court on the right to marry is Loving v. Virginia,”120
and that although “Loving arose in the context of racial discrimination, prior
and subsequent decisions of this Court confirm that the right to marry is of
fundamental importance for all individuals.”121 Yet, it is difficult to
understand how the Court can recognize that this right is of fundamental
importance for all individuals and nonetheless reject that it includes the right to
marry a same-sex partner, just as it would have been difficult to understand
how this right of fundamental importance for all individuals would not include
the right to marry someone of a different race.122 Further, lest it be thought
that the Zablocki Court was not even considering the implications of the
decision for same-sex couples, Justice Powell in his Zablocki concurrence
recognized that the decision might well have import for such couples.123

115. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
116. Id. (finding that essential interests protected by the Due Process Clause also include the
right to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, and to worship God according to the dictates of one’s own conscience).
117. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000).
118. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
119. Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451, 458 n.9 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2003).
120. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383.
121. Id. at 384.
122. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“The Fourteenth Amendment requires the
freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under our
Constitution, the freedom to marry or not marry, a person of another race resides with the
individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”).
123. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 399 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that “[s]tate regulation [of
marriage] has included bans on incest, bigamy, and homosexuality, as well as various
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The Standhardt court mischaracterized federal right to privacy
jurisprudence, misunderstanding the test for determining which rights are
fundamental as well as why marriage is protected. Yet, one of the most
disappointing aspects of the decision was the court’s willingness to uphold a
policy which was destructive of the very interests the State claimed it wished
to promote.
F.

On Promoting Stability for Children

Even assuming that the State’s same-sex marriage ban only merited
rational basis scrutiny, a separate question is whether the statute could
withstand even that minimal scrutiny, especially if a heightened rational basis
test is used. In her concurring opinion in Lawrence, Justice O’Connor stated,
“When a law exhibits . . . a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we
have applied a more searching form of rational basis review to strike down
such laws under the Equal Protection Clause.”124 She made clear that this
heightened form of rational basis review would be appropriately used when
examining statutes aiming to disadvantage on the basis of orientation.125 As an
illustration of when such scrutiny should be imposed, Justice O’Connor cited
Romer v. Evans, which struck down a Colorado amendment which would have
precluded the State from affording sexual orientation the protection of its antidiscrimination laws.126 Furthermore, she made clear that she would have
struck down the Texas same-sex sodomy statute on this basis.127
The claim here is not that Justice O’Connor indicated that same-sex
marriage bans could not pass muster given this level of scrutiny,128 although
Justice Scalia in his Lawrence dissent suggested that the reason for such
bans—“the State’s moral disapproval of same-sex couples”129—would likely
not pass constitutional muster.130 The claim is merely that Arizona’s asserted

preconditions to marriage, such as blood tests” and that “[a] ‘compelling state purpose’ inquiry
would cast doubt on the network of restrictions that that States have fashioned to govern marriage
and divorce”).
124. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
125. Id.
126. Id. (discussing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996)).
127. Id. at 582.
128. See id. at 585 (“Unlike the moral disapproval of same-sex relations—the asserted state
interest in this case—other reasons exist to promote the institution of marriage beyond mere
moral disapproval of an excluded group.”).
129. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130. Id. (“This reasoning leaves on pretty shaky grounds state laws limiting marriage to
opposite-sex couples.”).
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interest would likely not pass muster under such heightened rational basis
review.131
The rationale offered by Arizona for its same-sex marriage ban was that
the State “has a legitimate interest in encouraging procreation and child-rearing
within the stable environment traditionally associated with marriage, and that
limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples is rationally related to that
interest.”132 The court interpreted the State’s argument as suggesting that “by
legally sanctioning a heterosexual relationship through marriage, thereby
imposing both obligations and benefits on the couple and inserting the State in
the relationship, the State communicates to parents and prospective parents that
their long-term, committed relationships are uniquely important as a public
concern.”133 Yet, as the court recognized, “same-sex couples also raise
children, who would benefit from the stability provided by marriage within the
family.”134 Insofar as the State wants to emphasize that long-term committed
relationships are uniquely important as a public concern where children would
thereby benefit from the stability of such relationships, the State is
undermining its own goal by refusing to recognize same-sex relationships.
The State offered a surprising explanation for why it did not have an
interest in adding stability to families comprised of same-sex couples and their
children. The Standhardt court explained, “Because the State’s interest in
committed sexual relationships is limited to those capable of producing
children, it contends it reasonably restricts marriage to opposite-sex
couples.”135 Apparently, at least according to the Standhardt court, the State of
Arizona believes that sexual fidelity is important only in those relationships
which might produce children.
This is a fairly unusual position to take and one might expect that the
position would be reflected in other state laws. For example, Arizona
criminalizes adultery.136 Were the court’s interpretation of public policy
correct, one would expect that there would be no penalty for adultery were
there no possibility of procreation for any of the affected parties. Yet, Arizona
has no such exception to its criminal adultery statute.
Arizona precludes first cousins from marrying137 unless “both are sixtyfive years of age or older or if one of both first cousins are under sixty-five
131. See infra notes 132-147 and accompanying text (discussing the State’s failure to meet its
asserted interest in banning such marriages through its statute prohibiting same-sex marriages).
132. Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. Country of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451, 461 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2003).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 462.
135. Id. at 461 (emphasis added).
136. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1408 (West 2004).
137. Id. § 25-101.
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years of age, upon approval of any superior court judge in the state if proof has
been presented to the judge that one of the cousins is unable to reproduce.”138
Yet, one would not expect the State to make a special exception to permit such
couples to marry if the state has no interest in marriages which cannot produce
children. Basically, the court was misrepresenting Arizona public policy when
suggesting that the State had no interest in marriages which would not be
procreative.
The court understood that “opposite-sex couples are not required to
procreate in order to marry.”139 The court was not persuaded, however, that
this posed any problem for its analysis, reasoning that a perfect fit was not
required under the rational basis test.140 The court explained that “[a]llowing
all opposite-sex couples to enter into marriage under Arizona law, regardless
of their willingness or ability to procreate, does not defeat the reasonableness
of the link between opposite-sex marriage, procreation, and child-rearing.”141
The court offered several reasons in support: (1) “if the State excluded
opposite-sex couples from marriage based on their intention or ability to
procreate, the State would have to inquire about that subject before issuing a
license, thereby implicating constitutionally rooted privacy concerns,”142 (2)
“in light of medical advances affecting sterility, the ability to adopt, and the
fact that intentionally childless couples may eventually choose to have a child
or have an unplanned pregnancy, the State would have a difficult, if not
impossible, task in identifying couples who will never bear and/or raise
children,”143 and (3) “because opposite-sex couples have a fundamental right to
marry, excluding such couples from marriage could only be justified by a
compelling state interest, narrowly tailored to achieve that interest, which is
not readily apparent.”144
Yet, Arizona is already willing to ask couples about their ability to
procreate and will not allow first cousins below age sixty-five to marry unless
they can establish their inability to procreate.145 The existence of such a statute
has several implications. First, the State obviously does not believe that this
information cannot be the subject of inquiry because of privacy concerns.
Second, the Standhardt court is incorrect that the State places this premium on
procreative potential for would-be marital couples, since only first cousins who
138. Id. § 25-101(B).
139. Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 462.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 462 (citing Living v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1966) and
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
145. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101 (West 2004).
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cannot procreate are permitted to marry. Third, if the State took seriously the
possibility that couples currently unable to procreate might be able to
reproduce someday because of medical advances, the State would not allow
sterile first cousins to marry because it would fear that someday those cousins
might be able to have children because of medical breakthroughs. Thus, the
court’s claims about public policy are undermined rather than supported by
current state law and cannot plausibly be thought to represent the State’s actual
interests.
As a separate point, the court apparently believed that the possibility of
adoption would be one of the ways in which sterile couples might be viewed as
potentially procreative.146 The court might also have noted that couples might
make use of artificial insemination or surrogacy so that they could have a
child.147 Yet, same-sex couples might also adopt or make use of other
techniques whereby they might have a child so they too should be thought of
as potentially procreative.
The Standhardt court suggests that different-sex couples have the
fundamental right to marry. Yet, individuals rather than couples have the
fundamental right to marry.148 As the Eisenstadt Court suggested, a couple “is
not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association
of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup.”149
Further, all individuals have the right to marry,150 and the question at hand is
the scope of that right.
If the Standhardt court were correct that the fundamental right to marry is
linked to procreation in an important way, then one would expect that
individuals incapable of procreating would not be permitted to marry. In other
words, an individual’s right to marry would be construed as involving the right
to marry someone with whom that individual would be able to procreate. If it
were to turn out that there was no one with whom that individual could
procreate, then the individual simply could not marry.
Yet, such an understanding of the fundamental right to marry is not only
unfair and rather harsh, but it has no basis in the case law or in the right to
privacy jurisprudence. Such an inaccurate and offensive explication of the
right to marry could not be used to prevent sterile, different-sex couples from
marrying and is no more accurate or fairly used to prevent same-sex couples
from marrying.

146. Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 462.
147. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 25-218 (West 1991) (declared unconstitutional in Soos v.
Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994)).
148. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1977).
149. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1971).
150. See Zablocki, 434 U.S at 384.
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G. On Confusing Means and Ends
The Standhardt court explained why it was important for different-sex
couples to be encouraged to marry, noting that “by encouraging opposite-sex
couples to marry, thereby assuming legal and financial obligations, the
children born from such relationships will have better opportunities to be
nurtured and raised by two parents within long-term, committed relationships,
which society has traditionally viewed as advantageous for children.”151 Here,
the court seems to understand that the State’s interest is in providing an
advantageous setting for children and the means chosen to achieve that end is
to encourage marriage among those who might have children. Yet, the court
then seemed to change its focus from the end—providing a stable setting in
which children might flourish—to the means—encouraging different-sex
couples who might procreate to marry.
The court differentiated different-sex couples from same-sex couples by
noting, “Because same-sex couples cannot by themselves procreate, the State
could also reasonably decide that sanctioning same-sex marriages would do
little to advance the State’s interest in ensuring responsible procreation within
committed, long-term relationships.”152 Yet, if the Standhardt court is correct
that the State’s interest is in encouraging those raising children to have a stable
environment in which children might thrive, then the State should also be
interested in encouraging same-sex couples who raise or might raise children
to maintain a stable environment in which children might thrive. Children
need an environment in which they can thrive whether they are genetically
related to both of the parents raising them, one of the parents raising them or
neither of the parents raising them.153 Indeed, the court admitted that
“[c]hildren raised in families headed by a same-sex couple deserve and benefit
from bilateral parenting within long-term committed relationships just as much
as children with married parents.”154
The Standhardt court understood that permitting same-sex couples to
marry would not somehow affect the decision-making of different-sex couples
about whether or when to procreate—the court “agree[d] with Petitioners that
allowing same-sex couples to marry would not inhibit opposite-sex couples
from procreating.”155 Further, the court recognized that “the line drawn
between couples who may marry (opposite-sex) and those who may not (same-

151. Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 462-63.
152. Id. at 463.
153. Cassandra S. Haury, The Changing American Family: A Reevaluation of the Rights of
Foster Parents When Biological Parental Rights Have Been Terminated, 35 GA. L. REV. 313, 343
(2000).
154. Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 463.
155. Id.
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sex) may result in some inequity for children raised by same-sex couples.”156
Yet, the court failed to appreciate just how damning its own analysis was.
Basically, the court recognized that the statute created inequity because
children were being denied a benefit which they needed and deserved. Yet, it
is not as if the children are suffering a detriment for the sake of some greater
public interest. On the contrary, the State’s interests are also being
undermined when children are deprived of this benefit. Thus, the policy
adopted by the State undermines its own stated interests as well as the interests
of the children whom it claims to want to help and the court nonetheless claims
that “plausible reasons exist for placement of the current line.”157
If those reasons exist, neither the State nor the court saw fit to mention
them. Indeed, the court upheld a law based on its own mischaracterization of
privacy and right to marry jurisprudence and its attributing policies to the State
which are contradicted by existing statutes. While the court is correct that “the
only sexual relationship capable of producing children is one between a man
and a woman,”158 the State’s interest is in helping Arizona children to thrive,
regardless of how they came into the world. It is thus difficult to understand
how the court could uphold the Arizona law as even rationally related to the
State’s interests, since the ban is most plausibly understood to undermine the
interests of all of the concerned parties.
III. LEWIS ON THE RIGHT TO MARRY A SAME-SEX PARTNER
In Lewis v. Harris, a New Jersey trial court considered whether New
Jersey’s same-sex marriage ban violated constitutional guarantees.159 The
court held that it did not, offering a variety of justifications for its decision.
Some of the rationales offered in the Lewis opinion mirrored the
misunderstandings in the Standhardt decision and thus need not be reanalyzed
below. However, some of the Lewis analyses reflect misunderstandings and
improper analyses which did not appear in Standhardt and thus merit
examination and correction below if only to prevent their reappearance in the
case law.
A.

The Fundamental Right to Marry

156. Id.
157. Id. (citing Fed. Communications Comm’n v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307,
313-14, 315-16 (1993)).
158. Id. at 462.
159. Lewis v. Harris, No. MER-L-15-03, 2003 WL 23191114, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
Nov. 5, 2003).
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Like the Standhardt court, the Lewis court noted that Skinner suggests that
marriage is “fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race”160
without considering why marriage is so fundamental. Presumably, this is
because marriage is envisioned as helping to provide a setting in which the
next generation might flourish. Yet, given the connection between marriage
and having and raising children,161 one would have expected the Lewis court to
recognize that Skinner lends support to the recognition of same-sex marriage,
especially because New Jersey permits second-parent adoptions by same-sex
couples.162 Precisely because same-sex couples are having children through
adoption, surrogacy, or artificial insemination and thus have children to raise,
Skinner suggests that both society and the individuals themselves would
benefit if same-sex couples were permitted to marry.
Like the Standhart court, the Lewis court suggested that only rights
“deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition”163 can be fundamental,
and this court also failed to consider whether those fundamental rights
protected by the right to privacy could be so considered were that the
appropriate test. Like the Standhardt court, the Lewis court failed to take
Lawrence seriously. Indeed, the extent of the Lewis court’s analysis of that
decision was merely to note that “[i]n Lawrence, the Court held that a samesex couple’s right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them a right to
engage in consensual sexual activity in the home without government
intervention.”164
The Lewis court’s analysis of why same-sex marriage bans pass
constitutional muster was partly based on the supposition that the right to
marry “by its very essence includes only the union of persons of different
genders.”165 The court explained that “a prohibition on same-sex marriage is
not so much a limitation on the right to marry, but a defining element of that
right accepted for generations as an essential characteristic of marriage.”166
Indeed, the court suggested that “such a change [recognizing same-sex
marriage] would contradict the established and universally accepted legal
precept that marriage is the union of people of different genders.”167

160. Id. at *5 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
161. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
162. See In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 536 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1995).
163. Lewis, 2003 WL 23191114, at *8.
164. Id. at *23.
165. Id. at *13.
166. Id.
167. Id. See also Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451, 458
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (claiming that “recognizing a right to marry someone of the same sex
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This was a surprising tack for the court to take. Not only are same-sex
marriages being recognized in a sister state in 2004,168 but same-sex marriages
were already recognized in other countries before the Lewis opinion was
issued.169 Indeed, Justice Scalia in his Lawrence dissent noted that such
marriages can be celebrated in Canada.170 There is no universal understanding
regarding the impossibility or even impermissibility of same-sex marriage;
thus, this cannot be used to ground a decision not to recognize same-sex
unions.
B.

The Importance of the Interest at Stake

One of the more disturbing aspects of the Lewis opinion was the analysis
offered when the court balanced the interests affected by refusing to permit
same-sex couples to marry against the State’s interest in maintaining that ban.
The court explained, “The State has an interest in fostering and facilitating the
traditional notions of family and to be in harmony with other states that have
evaluated and considered the same issue.”171 The court gave short shrift to the
individual interests implicated, suggesting that “New Jersey’s ban on same-sex
marriage has, at most, a minimal effect on the ability of these couples to
maintain their relationships.”172 After all, the court noted, the “plaintiffs can
take steps available to any persons to ameliorate the harms they allege to suffer
with respect to property rights, inheritance, and health care decisionmaking.”173
It is difficult to tell whether the court was implicitly devaluing the
importance of marriage for same-sex couples in particular or for couples in
general. Same-sex couples have the same kinds of interests as do different-sex
couples: they may be responsible for children or elderly parents; they, too, may
wish to make “expressions of emotional support and public commitment,”174
and for them, too, marriage may be an “exercise of religious faith as well as an
would not expand the established right to marry, but would redefine the legal meaning of
‘marriage’”).
168. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding that the
State’s same-sex marriage ban violated the state constitution). Goodridge was decided after
Lewis. The point here is not that the Lewis court should have known what the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts would do, but merely that the court should never have been talking about
the established and universally accepted legal precept that marriage is only for individuals of
different sexes given what has been occurring in different countries and in different states.
169. See Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 459 n.11 (noting that such marriages are recognized in
Canada, the Netherlands and Belgium).
170. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
171. Lewis, 2003 WL 23191114, at *23.
172. Id. at *24.
173. Id. at *26.
174. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987).
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expression of personal dedication.”175 Yet, if same-sex couples and differentsex couples have the same interests implicated in marriage, then the Lewis
court would seem committed to saying that different-sex couples, if deprived
of the right to marry in New Jersey, would only be minimally affected in their
ability to maintain their relationships.
Presumably, the Lewis court would not have suggested that Virginia could
have refused to recognize the marriages of interracial couples in order to foster
and facilitate the traditional notions of family if only the State had been willing
to decriminalize fornication176 and allow such couples to “take steps available
to any persons to ameliorate the harms they allege to suffer with respect to
property rights, inheritance, and health care decision-making.”177 Nor,
presumably, would the court have thought such a statute permissible, even
were it true that there was “nothing to preclude these couples from forming
relationships and making personal commitments to one another.”178 Yet, these
rationales are no more persuasive for preventing same-sex couples from
marrying than for preventing interracial, different-sex couples from marrying.
C. On the Anti-Miscegenation Analogy
Understanding that the analogy to interracial marriage might seem
persuasive, the Lewis court tried to explain why it did not believe Loving v.
Virginia179 was analogous. The court explained, “It was entirely appropriate
for the courts to enforce those duly enacted Constitutional provisions by
striking down statutes that made race a qualifying condition for access to a
recognized right to marry.”180 However, the court reasoned, “no similar
Constitutional provisions outlaw statutory classifications based on sexual
orientation.”181
Yet, the court’s attempt to distinguish in this way is much too facile. First,
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads in relevant
part: “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”182 While the Amendment certainly protects
individuals from invidious racial discrimination, its protections are not limited
to racial discrimination—it suggests that no person shall be denied equal
175. Id. at 96.
176. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-344 (1996) (criminalizing fornication, although Lawrence
presumably makes such laws unenforceable).
177. Lewis, 2003 WL 23191114, at *26.
178. Id. at *25.
179. 388 U.S. 1 (1944).
180. Lewis, 2003 WL 23191114, at *20.
181. Id.
182. U.S.CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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protection of the laws. Further, the Lewis court implies that once the Civil War
amendments were passed, it was obvious that interracial marriage bans were
unconstitutional.183 However, as recently as 1956 the United States Supreme
Court suggested that a challenge to Virginia’s anti-miscegenation statute was
“devoid of a properly presented federal question.”184 It was not until 1967 that
the Loving Court struck down interracial marriage bans.185
The Lewis court suggested that the statute at issue in Loving was
constitutionally infirm because it made race a qualifying condition for
marriage, whereas the statute at issue before it was constitutionally permissible
because it was permissible to make orientation a qualifying condition for
marriage.186 This analysis is flawed for several reasons. First, it is not at all
clear that orientation can be made a qualifying condition for marriage without
violating the Constitution. The Zablocki Court suggested that “the right to
marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals.”187 Second, the court
misrepresented the nature of the law. Orientation is not a qualifying condition
for marriage, even in New Jersey.188 Indeed, the Lewis court itself noted that
the plaintiffs, “like anyone else in the state, may receive a marriage license,
provided that they meet the statutory criteria for marriage, including an
intended spouse of the opposite gender.”189 Third, New Jersey makes sex
rather than orientation a qualifying condition for marriage.190 Just as Virginia
made race a qualifying condition by specifying which races could marry, New
Jersey made sex a qualifying condition by specifying which sexes could marry.
Justice Scalia in his Lawrence dissent noted that the same-sex sodomy
prohibition at issue in Lawrence “does distinguish between the sexes insofar as
concerns the partner with whom the sexual acts are performed: men can violate
the law only with other men, and women only with other women.”191 He then
pointed out that “it is precisely the same distinction regarding partner that is
drawn in state laws prohibiting marriage with someone of the same sex while
permitting marriage with someone of the opposite sex.”192 A separate issue is
whether the sex-based marital restriction passes constitutional muster, but the

183. Lewis, 2003 WL 23191114, at *21.
184. See Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (per curiam).
185. See Loving, 388 U.S. 1.
186. Lewis, 2003 WL 23191114, at * 21.
187. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978).
188. Lewis, 2003 WL 23191114, at *22.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599-600 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Bray
v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 323 n.20 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (“A classification is sex based if it classifies on the basis of sex.”).
192. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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statute makes the sex of the would-be spouse a qualifying condition for the
marriage.
The Lewis court seemed unsure whether sex or orientation was the basis of
the classification. For example, when explaining why the New Jersey statutes
were “facially neutral,”193 the court noted that “they apply with equal force to
all men and all women in the state.”194 Yet, if, as the court suggested,
orientation is the basis of the classification,195 then the fact that the statute
applies with equal force to men and women would not speak to whether the
statute was facially neutral. Rather, the court would have to suggest that the
statute applied with equal force to individuals regardless of their sexual
orientation.
The court noted that the “[s]tate makes the same benefit, mixed-gender
marriage, available to all individuals on the same basis,”196 suggesting that
“[w]hether or not plaintiffs wish to enter into a mixed-gender marriage is not
determinative of the statute’s validity.”197 The important issue “is the
availability of the right on equal terms, not the equal use of the right that is
central to the constitutional analysis.”198
Of course, an analogous argument would have supported Virginia’s
position in Loving where the state made the same benefit, same-race marriage,
available to all individuals on the same basis and Richard Loving’s wish not to
enter into a same-race marriage would not be determinative of the statute’s
validity.199 Unlike the Lewis court, Justice Scalia understood the difficulty
posed for his position given Loving, and attempted to address it by suggesting
that the statutes at issue in Loving were invidious because they were designed
While he is correct that the antito maintain white supremacy.200
miscegenation statutes were designed to maintain white supremacy201 and that
the statutes at issue were unconstitutional,202 he is incorrect insofar as he is
implying that the statutes would not have been held unconstitutional but for
their being intended to maintain white supremacy.
Basically, Justice Scalia suggests that Loving is disanalogous by denying
that Virginia made the same benefits available to all.203 As the Loving Court

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Lewis, 2003 WL 23191114, at * 22.
Id.
Id. at *20.
Id. at *22.
Id.
Lewis, 2003 WL 23191114, at * 22.
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.
Id. at 12.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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noted, “Virginia prohibits whites from marrying any nonwhite (subject to the
exception for the descendants of Pocahontas), [but] Negroes, Orientals, and
any other racial class may intermarry without statutory interference.”204 Yet,
Virginia’s having treated the races differently does not end the matter, since
the question then becomes whether the Court would have upheld a statute
which made the same benefit, same-race marriage, available to all individuals
on the same basis. We need not speculate about the answer. Justice Scalia’s
implicit claim to the contrary notwithstanding, the Loving Court made clear
that “the racial classifications in these statutes [are] repugnant to the
Fourteenth Amendment, even assuming an even-handed state purpose to
protect the ‘integrity’ of all races.”205 As the Loving Court explained, “Under
our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race
resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”206 Thus, the
Virginia statute would have been struck down even had it not been motivated
by white supremacy. Marital classifications cannot be made on the basis of
race regardless of the state’s motivation and regardless of whether or not the
statute is evenhanded in application.207
The Supreme Court has suggested that statutory classifications based on
race or sex must be examined closely208 to make sure that they do not involve
invidious discrimination.209 Under the Federal Constitution, race-based
classifications are subjected to strict scrutiny while sex-based classifications
are subject to heightened scrutiny.210 Thus, the fact that a race-based marriage
statute did not pass constitutional muster does not establish that a sex-based
marriage statute would also be constitutionally infirm. Nonetheless, two points
might be made about the scrutiny given to classifications on the basis of sex.

204. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 n.11.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 489 (1989) (suggesting that all
race-based classifications must be examined closely); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,
524 (1996) (“[A] party seeking to uphold government action based on sex must establish an
‘exceedingly persuasive justification for the classification.’”) (quoting Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
209. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[A]ll government
action based on race . . . should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the
personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been infringed.”); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 136 (1994) (noting that the Nation’s long history of sex discrimination
“warrants the heightened scrutiny we afford all gender-based classifications . . . .”).
210. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 154 (Renquest, J., dissenting) (“Classifications based on race are
inherently suspect, triggering ‘strict scrutiny,’ while gender-based classifications are judged under
a heightened, but less searching, standard of review.”).
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First, as the Court made clear in United States v. Virginia,211 “a party seeking
to uphold government action based on sex must establish an ‘exceedingly
persuasive justification’ for the classification.”212 Second, insofar as the Lewis
court was examining the statute under the state constitution, it would have to
have used strict scrutiny, since gender is a suspect classification under the New
Jersey Constitution.213
Needless to say, the Lewis court did not subject the statutory classification
to heightened scrutiny, much less strict scrutiny. Indeed, the Lewis court
mentioned surprisingly few state interests which would allegedly be supported
by such a ban. The court did point to bans on bigamous marriages, common
law marriages, and incestuous marriages, justifying each,214 but then noted that
“a ban on same-sex marriage differs from those listed above.”215 Nonetheless,
the court concluded without offering additional justification that “the interest
of the State in limiting marriage to mixed-gender couples is a valid and
reasonable exercise of government authority.”216 Apparently, the court
believed that the State’s interest in fostering and facilitating the traditional
notions of family justified the State’s same-sex marriage ban, notwithstanding
the State’s having rejected those notions so that both members of same-sex
couples might be recognized as legal parents of the children that they were
raising, notwithstanding the fundamental interests of the adults involved, and
notwithstanding the State’s interest in providing stable homes for adults and
children so that all of these individuals might thrive and be productive
members of society.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Lawrence v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court struck down a
Texas law criminalizing same-sex sodomy.217 While the majority was careful
not to address whether same-sex marriages are protected by the Federal
Constitution, the Court nonetheless suggested that liberties protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment could not be ascertained
simply by considering which interests had historically been protected.218 The
Court was not thereby revolutionizing due process jurisprudence, given that
some of the liberties that the Court has already recognized as protected by the
211. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
212. Id. at 524.
213. Lewis v. Harris, No. MER-L-15-03, 2003 WL 23191114, at * 18 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. Nov. 5, 2003).
214. Id. at *24.
215. Id. at *25.
216. Id.
217. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
218. Id.
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Due Process Clause could hardly have been described as “deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition” or “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”
Nonetheless, the Court’s explicitly rejecting that approach deserves careful
consideration, since it will affect any analysis of whether a particular interest is
fundamental or protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In her Lawrence concurrence, Justice O’Connor suggested that regulations
imposing burdens on the basis of sexual orientation should be examined in
light of a heightened rational basis test to make sure that state regulations are
not merely imposing burdens because of animosity towards the class
affected.219 While she suggested that there might be legitimate state reasons to
restrict marriage to different-sex couples, she did not suggest any, and it is
simply unclear what articulated reasons by the State would suffice under this
test. Two state supreme courts struck down their respective states’ same-sex
marriage bans under their own possibly heightened rational basis tests.220
In his Lawrence dissent, Justice Scalia suggested that the Lawrence
decision paved the way for the recognition of same-sex marriage221 and that
same-sex marriage bans classify on the basis of sex.222 While he claimed that
the Constitution does not prohibit such classifications,223 he offered a clearly
incorrect reading of Loving v. Virginia to justify that assertion.224
Two state courts examining whether their respective state’s same-sex
marriage bans passed muster under federal constitutional guarantees had the
benefit of Lawrence to help them decide whether such bans pass constitutional
muster. That decision notwithstanding, both courts offered implausible
interpretations of the right to privacy jurisprudence which cannot account for
those rights which have been recognized as fundamental and protected by the
right to privacy even bracketing whether same-sex marriage is also protected.

219. Id. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
220. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003) (“[W]e
conclude that the marriage ban does not meet the rational basis test for either due process or equal
protection.”); Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 889 (Vt. 1999) (suggesting that the state must
afford same-sex couples all of the rights and obligations of marriage); see id. at 880 n.13 (The
court declined to apply heightened or strict scrutiny); see id. at 871 (The court instead used a kind
of heightened rational basis test which was “broadly deferential to the legislative prerogative to
define and advance governmental ends, while vigorously ensuring that the means chosen bear a
just and reasonable relation to the governmental objective.”).
221. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today’s opinion dismantles the
structure of constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual
and homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned.”).
222. Id. at 599-600 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
224. See supra notes 200-07 and accompanying text (discussing why Justice Scalia’s analysis
of Loving is inaccurate).
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Each court offered an account of local public policy which is undermined
rather than supported by existing state law. Both courts made assertions about
the interests implicated in marriage which are so obviously false that they
would never be made in any other context. The Standhardt court suggested
that the state is only interested in marriages which might produce children
through the union of the married parties225 and the Lewis court seriously
undervalued the individual’s interests in marriage.226
Justice Scalia concluded his Lawrence dissent by suggesting that Lawrence
did not involve same-sex marriage “only if one entertains the belief that
principle and logic have nothing to do with the decisions of this Court.”227 The
Standhardt and Lewis decisions seem to illustrate Justice Scalia’s point, since
both had to misconstrue the relevant constitutional jurisprudence and public
policy in order to uphold the same-sex marriage bans before them. It can only
be hoped that principle and logic will sometime govern in this area, although
Lewis and Standhardt give little hope that this will occur any time soon.

225. Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451, 461 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2003) (emphasis added).
226. Lewis v. Harris, No. MER-L-15-03, 2003 WL 23191114, at *24 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. Nov. 5, 2003).
227. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

